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A model is developed in which economic agents learn to make price-
setting, price-response, and resource allocation decisions in decentralized 
markets where all information and interaction is local.  Computer 
simulation shows that it is possible for agents to act almost as if they had 
the additional necessary information to define and solve a standard 
optimization problem.  Their behaviour gives rise endogenously to 
phenomena resembling Adam Smith's invisible hand.  The results also 
indicate that agents must engage in some form of price comparison for 
decentralized markets to clear--otherwise there is no incentive for firms to 
respond to excess supply by lowering prices.  This suggests that agent-
based models with decentralized interaction risk untenable results if price-
response decisions are made without being first directed toward the most 
favourable local price. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents an agent-based computational economic (ACE) general 
equilibrium model in which boundedly rational agents learn to produce and trade in such 
a way that the outcome resembles a competitive equilibrium guided by the invisible hand 
of Adam Smith.  ACE models thus far have not overcome the difficulties imposed by 
having agents learning to propose and respond to prices while having the subsequent 
results guide agents' decisions about resource allocation.  Such difficulties have either 
limited the scope of ACE models to partial equilibrium settings or required deviation 
from the methodology of having phenomena emerge from agents' behaviour. 
ACE models employ autonomous interacting agents to simulate an economy or 
some aspect of one and as such treat the subject of study as a complex adaptive system 
(Tesfatsion 2001a).  Any system-wide regularities emerge from the actions and decisions 
  1 explicitly modelled at the agents' level rather than being imposed by the modeller.  An 
example of this is Howitt and Clower's (2000) model in which through a process of 
search and trade agents create a form of money employing a good with low transaction 
costs.  The assumption that agents have the necessary information and ability to define 
and solve an optimization problem is relaxed in an ACE model and agents typically 
employ learning schemes to guide their behaviour.  Often the models are such that the 
agents' optimal behaviour can be determined and used as a benchmark from which to 
evaluate the results.  For example Arifovic (1996) has agents in an overlapping 
generations framework use a genetic algorithm
2 as a learning scheme to determine their 
consumption/savings decision and to allocate their savings between two different fiat 
currencies which allows the agents to (nearly) settle on the optimal savings/consumption 
decision.
3  The growing body of ACE literature has addressed issues in finance (LeBaron 
2000), labour markets (Tesfatsion 2001b), R&D investment (Yildizoglu 2002), foreign 
exchange markets (Arifovic 1996,2001a, and 2001b), signalling (Arifovic and Eaton 
1998 and DeVany and Lee 2001), auction design (Bower and Bunn 2001), development 
(Arifovic et al 1997), the demand for money (Howitt and Clower 2000), and industrial 
organization (Price 1997).   
  Despite the approach of explicitly modelling from the agent up and avoiding the 
imposition of system-wide controlling artifices with no real-world analogue, ACE models 
have not yet lived up to that potential with regards to the Walrasian Auctioneer.  With the 
exception of Kirman and Vriend (2001) no ACE model has been developed in which 
                                                 
2 Formalized by Holland (1977). 
3 The central result of the model is that the exchange rate fluctuates, whereas the rational expectations 
equilibrium of the equivalent model (Karaken and Wallace 1981) has a stable but indeterminate exchange 
rate. 
  2 agents learn to propose and respond to prices.  They develop a model where wholesalers 
learn strategies governing stocking, queue-ordering and pricing who interact with 
retailers who learn strategies governing queue-choosing and price-response.  The focus of 
their paper is not on pricing behaviour but on loyalty.
4  Their model has only one good so 
it is not clear if the price-related decisions are appropriate in a general equilibrium 
setting. 
  The majority of ACE models have agents learning to make non-pricing decisions 
and a Walrasian auctioneer subsequently determining the market clearing price.
5  Many 
other ACE models focus on issues in such a way that prices do not play a role and hence 
there is no call for price decisions nor a Walrasian auctioneer.
6  Other approaches taken 
involve having different agents propose different but immutable prices (Rouchier et al 
2001), having pricing decisions follow an (unlearned) rule of thumb (Howitt and Clower 
2000), bypassing a local bargaining process by having agents trade at a price determined 
as some defensible function of agent attributes (Epstein and Axtell 1996
7 and Dawid 
1999), and having agents learn to set prices but responding to prices by optimally 
choosing a quantity (Dawid 2000). 
  The lack of an emergent replacement for, or equivalent of, the Walrasian 
auctioneer has not gone unnoticed in the literature.  Taking the 'invisible hand' of Adam 
                                                 
4 Although the agents' decision-making process does not allow them to formulate strategies in such terms, it 
appears that the retailers act as if they pay a price premium and exhibit loyalty to their chosen wholesaler in 
order to secure a guaranteed supply.   
5 Examples of this include Arifovic (1995, 1996, 1998, 20001a, and 2001b), Arifovic and Ramazan (2000), 
Dawid and Kopel (1998), Duffy (2001), Price (1997), Tay and Linn (2001), Vriend (2000), and Yildizoglu 
(2002) as well as those modelling financial markets. 
6 Examples of this include Andersson and Sandholm (2001), Arifovic and Eaton (1998), DeVany and Lee 
(2001), and Tesfatsion (2001b). 
7 In chapter IV, Epstein and Axtell present a decentralized model with two goods that are traded at local 
prices.  While they find that the mean price is that expected if agents fully optimized, the agents in their 
model do not learn but instead follow immutable rules of thumb. 
  3 Smith to be the process by which optimal allocation of resources across sectors of the 
economy emerges from the self-interested actions of economic agents, Kochugovindan 
and Vriend (1998) argue that existing formal economic models treat it as a black box by 
relying on fictitious constructs, including the Walrasian auctioneer.  They speculate that 
the study of complex adaptive systems may yield insight into how a decentralized 
economy gives rise to this emergent property.  Leijonhufvud (1999) makes a similar 
argument.  Arifovic (2000 p241) surveys models with evolutionary learning algorithms.  
In her conclusion she discusses the state of affairs in the literature in so far as price 
determination is concerned and the hurdle it presents for more comprehensive ACE 
models: 
  One of the challenges that the research in this area faces is the 
extension of evolutionary models to the general equilibrium type of 
economies with multiple markets.  The main issue is the one of 
determination of prices.  These models cannot take advantage of 
computing prices through simultaneous determination of agents' optimal 
decisions and market-clearing conditions.  Instead, the calculation of 
prices has to be explicitly modeled by describing a bargaining process or 
some other equilibrating mechanism.  This adds an extra layer of 
complexity on top of the dynamics that tend to be quite complicated 
anyway.  However, this obstacle will have to be overcome if these models 
are to be more widely used in the general equilibrium setting. 
 
Such a successful general equilibrium ACE model would, inherently, elucidate the 
invisible hand as an emergent property.   
  The purpose of this paper is to present and analyse such a model.  In this model, 
agents must decide to produce one of two goods and then have the opportunity to engage 
in trade for the other good via a sequence of local interactions with other agents.  Agents 
learn which good to produce as well as pricing and purchasing strategies.   
  4 The resultant dynamics mirror how the invisible hand is normally described as 
functioning: A shortage (surplus) of one good results in its price rising (falling) and 
agents respond by shifting resources towards (away from) the production of that good.  
This allocation however cycles around the optimal one.  There is a lag between the 
introduction of a shortage (surplus) and agents' ability to perceive this and adjust prices in 
response.  Thus when the shortage (surplus) is corrected, prices continue to be above 
(below) market-clearing levels for that optimal allocation, and resources continue to 
move, creating a surplus (shortage) of the good in question.   
Additionally, agents must engage in price comparison—visiting a number of 
agents to collect price information and patronizing first those agents offering the most 
favourable prices—for the outcome to resemble a competitive equilibrium.  This provides 
agents with an incentive to respond to a surplus of the good they produce by lowering 
prices. 
The next section presents the model.  Section three presents and analyses the 
results.  Section four presents and analyses results of variations of the base model.  
Section five concludes. 
2.  THE BASE MODEL 
2.0  Overview of the Base Model 
 There  are  n agents who live for T  periods and have identical preferences over 
two goods.  Table 1 gives the values used for the parameters.  Every period each agent 
decides which of two goods to produce.  Each agent then has a series of opportunities to 
engage in bilateral trade with a number of other agents.  Any particular agent will, in  
 
  5 Table 1: Parameter Values 
Parameter  Parameter Name  Value Used 
n  Number of agents  1000 
T  Number of periods  1000 
e1  Production level for good one  1 
e2  Production level for good two  1 
v  Number of agents visited per period  10 
ρ  Preference parameter  0.6 and 0.3 
JCR  Job change rate  0.01 
MR Mutation  rate  0.1 
δ Mutation  radius  0.1 
 
some trades, act as a store by offering a specific exchange.  In other trades, that same 
agent will act as a customer by responding to an offered exchange.  Subsequent to the  
trades of a period, each agent revises its strategies by imitating the strategies of the most 
successful agents encountered during trade.  Some of the agents then mutate some of 
their strategies through a stochastic process.  A period ends with consumption. 
  Each period thus consists of five stages:  
  i)  Production 
  ii)  Trading 
  iii)  Imitation 
  iv)  Mutation 
  v)  Consumption 
  6 which are explained in detail below.  Additionally, appendix A presents the base model 
as a Gauss program. 
2.1  The Production Stage 
  An agent is assumed to be able to produce only one of the two goods in any given 
period.  Production behaviour is dictated for agent a
8 by its production strategy 
.  If  , agent   produces   units of good one; while if  , 
agent a produces   units of good two. 
{} wpa ∈ 12 , wpa = 1
e2
a e1 wpa = 2
2.2  The Trading Stage 
  A given agent  's trading behaviour is dictated by its exchange strategies 
.  These exchange strategies and the production strategy 
 make up agent  's entire complement of strategies.   
a




                                                
At the beginning of every period, each agent a selects v different agents to visit 
that form a set Γ  of agents.    is determined through an independent random process; 
in particular, it is independent of agent a's strategies, any   formed in previous periods, 
and any   where a .  Every possible set of   of the n  other agents is equally 
likely to make up  .  A pair of agents is assumed to not trade with each other if they 
both produced the same good.  Thus a set γ  is formed by dropping from   agents 
producing the same good as agent a.  γ  consists of the agents that agent   will visit 
and potentially trade with, where agent b  acts as a store and agent   acts as a 
customer.   
a Γa
Γa









8 Regarding notation: a, b, and c are used to denote agents; i and j are used to denote goods; s and t are used 
to denote time periods.  Variables representing sets of agents and strategies have implicit subscripts 
denoting the period which are usually suppressed for readability where there is no loss of clarity.   
Occasionally, when it facilitates exposition, the agent subscripts are also suppressed. 
  7  Agent  b, acting as a store, is assumed to offer its good in a package of a size 
fixed for the period at   where  .  Agent b additionally offers a price, also fixed 
for the duration of the period.  The price agent   faces when visiting agent b is given by 






; agent b offers o  units of the good it produced (good  jb j )  and in exchange requests 
 units of the other good (good  , which agent a produced).  rib i
  A proposed exchange is carried out if both agents involved have sufficient 
holdings of  the good they produced available for trade.  Each agent   keeps   (where 
) of the good it produced for personal consumption, putting up the remaining 
 for trade.  (Goods put up for trade but not actually traded are still available to the 
producing agent later for consumption.)  Thus if agent   (the customer) visits agent   
(the store), agent a gives to agent     units of good iw  and receives o  units of 
good   if and only if   and   where   denotes 
agent a's current holdings of good i.  Note that if agent   produces good one in some 
period, only {  are used to determine its trade behaviour; while if  , 




iw p a =
ek ii −


















k ia ia −≥ k jb jb xia
k a 1 ,, =
 An  agent  a is assumed to go to the agents-as-stores in γ  in an order determined 
by their offered prices, visiting first those agents-as-stores that offer more favourable 





γ a γ  where b  if and 




q + a ∈ γ
v
a γ  and   is element   in  1
v










≤  where  .  Should agents   have strategies  wp wp p bc == j w ≠ a bc , ∈ a
v
γ
  8 such that the prices they offer are equal, b is as likely to come before   in  c
a
v
a γ  as the 
other way around and this is determined by a random process independent of any aspect 
of the state of the model. 
γ
v





γ n  for a  are formed, the whole of the n 
agents are randomly ordered into   (with t  indicating the period).  Each possible   is 
chosen with equal independent probability; in particular,   is independent of agents' 
strategies and the set of any prior such orderings {}.   



















a γ .  If they engage in a 
trade it is the end of agent  's 'turn'.  If not, agent   moves to the second agent in  a a
v
a γ  and 
if it engages in a trade with this agent, it is the end of agent a's turn.  If no trade occurs 







a γ  
and similarly continues to move through γ  until either it engages in a trade (ending its 
turn) or it has reached the end of 
v
a γ  (which also ends its turn).  Agent  's turn being 
over, the second agent b in   similarly has a turn to go through  .  Then the third 
agent in   has a turn and so on until the  th and final agent in   has had its turn.  
Call this process—the n agents each getting a turn to attempt to trade as a customer with 








γ —a trading run.   
  The entire trading stage of a period consists of the formation of   and {}  
followed by trading runs which occur until no more trades are made (i.e. a trading run 









γ s).  Since a typical trading stage will involve hundreds of trading runs, 
  9 agents who are stuck on the short side of an excess supply or demand outcome find 
themselves there more likely due to their strategies rather than their placement in the 
random order of movement,  .   
v
Nt
  One way to conceive of the trading stage is to suppose that agents can shop and 
maintain their stores simultaneously, that a store sells discrete packages at a rate 
(packages per unit time per customer) that is constant across stores, and that the store is 
able to service an arbitrary number of customers simultaneously.  Agents begin the 
trading period having already sampled some price information and going to their most 
preferred store.  Whenever a store runs out of stock, agents at that store all disperse to 
their next-most preferred store and the process continues until all mutually agreeable 
trades between agents and the stores they visit have been exhausted. 
2.3   The Imitation Stage 





Each agent has a set of agents met during the exchange stage including the   
agents on its visitation list, the randomly determined number of agents that visited it, as 
well as itself.   Thus if   is the set of agents met by agent   then b  if and only if 
, a , or a .  This set of agents met is divided into two groups based on 
which good they produced, with the imitating agent itself in both groups:   and 














a ∈ µ wp i b = =
Agents are assumed to imitate their active exchange strategies from the agent met 
that obtained higher utility than any other agent met that produced the same good.  
Agents are assumed to imitate their inactive exchange strategies from the agent met that 
obtained higher utility than any other agent met that produced that good, but only if that 
  10 highest-performing agent obtained more utility than the imitating agent.  Otherwise it 
retains the same inactive exchange strategies.  So, for i  if during period  , b  
and  , U  then   during period t  will equal 
 during period t .
= 12 , t ia ∈ µ
∀∈ ≠ cc ia µ :
{} ork ib ib ,,
b U b > c }
c
Γ ∨ ∈
                                                
{ ork ia ia ia ,, + 1
ib
9 
With probability  , the agent looks to the agent encountered who obtained the 
highest utility (regardless of the good produced) and imitates   from that agent.  So if 
during period t , b  and  , U  then (with probability  )   





∀∈ ≠ cc ia µ :
wpb




It is during the imitation stage that agents make use of more information than at 
any other stage in the model.  In order for the imitation stage to be carried out, agents 
must know at least what each agent met obtained in goods at the end of the trading stage 
as well as the active exchange strategies of up to two other agents (perhaps best viewed 
as selected by the agent in question).  To facilitate later discussion, agents' information 
sets are assumed to be greater than this bare minimum.  Agent  's information set at 
period  ,  , is assumed to include the goods obtained, and the strategies used, by all 
agents encountered during period  .  Agents are assumed to have perfect recall of 
information gathered in the past as well as the ability to identify previously encountered 




() [] {} ΩΓ at sb sb sb sb sa sb XXw p e xs t b a =≤ ∈ 12 ,,,:,   
 
9 If, in some set of agents met, (µ1a and µ2a for exchange strategies or µa for the production strategy) there 
are more than one agent with the highest utility level, the agent to be imitated is determined as follows:  If 
the imitating agent a is one of those with the highest utility it retains the strategies to be imitated i.e. 
imitates itself.  Otherwise, if there are members of Γa with the highest level of utility, those members of Γa 
are each equally likely to be chosen for imitation by an independent random process.  Otherwise all agents 
with the highest level of utility (none of who is agent a nor a member of Γa) are each equally likely to be 
chosen for imitation by an independent random process. 
  11 where   represents agent a's holdings of good i at the end of the trading stage of 





2.4   The Mutation Stage 
The six exchange strategies are all subject to mutation; the production strategy, 
, is not. wp
10  Each agent perturbs each of its exchange strategies separately with 
independent probability  .  If a strategy is to be mutated and its initial value is  , its 
new value will be independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval 
. 
MR x
() () [] 11 −+ δδ xx ,
2.5   The Consumption Stage 
  In the consumption stage, each agent   consumes all of its holdings of the two 
goods and experiences utility Ux .  The goods are assumed to be perishable, so 










                                                
0 {} ∀∈ i 12 , {} an ∈ 12 ,, . . . ,
2.6  The Initial State  
  The strategies in period 1 are determined by random and independent draws for 
each agent and each strategy.  Strategies  ,  , and   are drawn from a uniform 
distribution over [  while  ,  , and   are drawn from [ .  Note that a value 




0 1 ,e o2 r2 2 0 2 ,e
 
10 View the imitative learning process as a search algorithm that combs through the set of sensible 
exchange strategies []  as well as the set of production strategies { .  Mutation of 
exchange strategies is necessary for a comprehensive search.  So long as both goods are being produced, 
mutation of the production strategy is not, and so is neglected in order to avoid subjecting the results to any 





,, ee × } 12 ,
  12 negative value is equally unacceptable.








2.7 The Bargaining Structure and Homo Economicus   
  The bilateral bargaining encounters in the base model are ones in which one agent 
 proposes a price-quantity pair ( , while the other agent  's response is 
determined by some function  .  The base model uses 


















   if    and   otherwise.  The response 
function used is 
xo () pq
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otherwise.  The dictum that agents should do as well as they can under the circumstances 
ostensibly suggests that agents should instead use   if acceptance of 
the proposed exchange would cause agent  's utility to rise and   if it 
would cause utility to fall.   
() f p q bb *,
 However,  agent  a has sufficient information to make its problem more 
complicated than simply choosing from {  to maximize U  at the end of 
the exchange.  The perfectly rational agent should be making its response based on 
 where   is the price it faces now as a customer and   is the price it offers 
as a store in any future bilateral bargaining situations to come during the current period 
.  In particular, the response decision is complicated by the fact that when   is a more 
pt reject , a





11 The fact that oia > eia – kia would also preclude trade if wpa = i is not used to further restrict the range that 
oia is drawn from.  Instead agents must, and do, learn to set oia < eia – kia. 
  13 favourable price for agent   than  , a pb
12 the purchases that agent   now makes limit the 
uncertain quantity of future trading at a more favourable price.  (Note that if agents know  
the initial conditions and other agents' preferences, the expected utility of each response 









13)   
  As an optimization problem, the agents' situation is better viewed as imperfectly 
choosing a quantity to purchase based on a distribution of prices to be faced.  More 
accurately, agent  's problem involves choosing a quantity to attempt to spend ( ) 
and a price-quantity pair, for its store behaviour, based on Ω .  Last period's 
information set is enough to compute the distribution of other agents' strategies this 
period and define the expectation of U .   The agents do not perform any optimization, 
so if they manage to settle on a nearly optimal outcome, this is due entirely to the 
learning algorithm.  This would open up the possibility that the learning algorithm can be 




3.  RESULTS OF THE BASE MODEL 
  The purpose of this model is to subject bargaining decisions (price setting and 
price response) to a learning algorithm in an information-poor general equilibrium 
environment to gauge their ability to generate behaviour leading to an optimal (in this 
case synonymous with competitive) outcome.  Since the economic process in the model 
is subject to noise, assessing the degree of optimality of the outcome is not 
straightforward.   
 
12 Which the results show is usually the case. 
13 Assuming that all other agents follow the simple imitation and mutation rules. 
  14   The most obvious criteria for evaluation would be implemented by assessing the 
observed welfare outcomes and comparing them to what would be realized by a perfect 
information general equilibrium outcome. However any particular outcome (in terms of 
resource allocation and consumption patterns) can be characterized as arbitrarily close or 
far from the optimal outcome using utility functions that are monotonic transformations 
of each other.  Utility can be appropriately used to rank the ability of different variations 
of the model to achieve the optimal outcome.  In an attempt to impose some rigour on 
this, only utility functions which were homogeneous of degree one were used.  When 
reported, utility will be as a percentage of the optimal outcome's level. 
  Another criteria for consideration is the degree to which the aggregate price level 
comes close to the competitive equilibrium level.  But since the model will produce price 
dispersion, it is problematic to declare that some given level of price variance is 
compatible with being near an optimal outcome, even if the mean price is at the GE 
level.
14 
  The third criteria used is resource allocation.  When the resource allocation is near 
to optimal, the imitative learning algorithm is deemed to work in the sense that it gives 
rise to a nearly competitive allocation that full information and rational behaviour would 
produce.   
While none of these criteria are entirely satisfactory since they do not indicate 
how near to optimal the results need to be to declare the outcome nearly optimal, in 
practice it turns out that for the various versions of the model analysed, it is almost 
                                                 
14 In section four, one variation of the base model produces a mean price at the competitive level but 
arbitrarily large price dispersion. 
  15 always straightforward to tell when the decision-making algorithm has produced (or 
failed to produce) a nearly optimal resource allocation. 
  The model is run for 1000 periods.  10 such runs were made and the results were 
qualitatively similar.  During the first 500 periods rho (the preference parameter) is set at 
0.6.  For the last 500 periods it is 0.3.  With the parameter values listed in table 1, the 
competitive equilibrium would involve 1000 agents producing good 1 (with the other 
 agents producing good 2), and trades occurring at a price of 1 so that each 




( 1000 1− ρ)
ρ
This base model is also run without agents engaging in price comparison i.e. 
where an agent   does not, at the beginning of the exchange stage, order the agents it 




γ  according to the prices offered by those agents in 
v
a γ ; the order in which 
those agents will be visited is, instead, random.   
  Figure 1a shows the number of agents producing good 1 for the base model with 
and without agents engaging in price comparison.  The straight lines, at 600 agents for 
the first 500 periods and 300 agents for the last 500 periods, show the competitive 
equilibrium resource allocation.  Figure 1b shows the mean price of good 1 at which 
trades occurred for the two versions of the base model (again with a line at 1 showing the 
competitive result) and figure 1c shows the mean utility agents realized each period.  For 
all three graphs, only every fifth observation is shown since otherwise they are 
indecipherable.  Furthermore, prices of good one greater than two are shown as two since 
  16 values could be as high as sixteen.  Prices above two were rarely observed in the runs 
with price comparison.
15  
With agents engaging in price comparison, the price hovers near the competitive 
equilibrium price.  This allows for resource allocation approximating that of a 
competitive equilibrium, and a correspondingly higher mean utility.  
Note that price and resource allocation cycle around the competitive level.  When 
less than the competitive level of good one is being produced, the mean price rises above  
the competitive level, inducing more agents to produce it.  This process occurs until 
competitive resource allocation levels are reached, at which point the price has not yet 
fallen to reflect this.  Agents continue to switch to producing good one and it is then over-
produced.  Eventually the price begins to reflect this and agents start switching to 
production of good two.  When competitive resource allocation is again achieved, the 
price has yet to reflect this, and so the economy goes back to overproducing good one. 
  This process's dynamics have two driving forces to be explored: 
1) When the price of a good is below the competitive level, agents switch away from 
producing it. 
2) When the economy produces more than the competitive level of a good, that good's 
mean price falls below the competitive level.  
Each of these is examined in turn: 
Ignoring the impact of the decision of how much of one's product to reserve for 
personal consumption (or assuming it is optimally made), agents are equally well off 
regardless of which good they produce if all trades occur at the competitive equilibrium.  
                                                 
15 When observed they are attributable to the initial conditions; the latest they were observed was the 31st 
period. 
  17 Figure 1a: 
Triangles: With Price Comparison
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  18 Figure 1c: 
Triangles: With Price Comparison














Mean Utility with and without Price Comparison
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price.  Thus if the average price of good one is above the competitive level, the average 
agent producing good one is better off than the average agent producing good two, and so 
an agent considering switching its production good is more likely to imitate an agent 
producing good one.  The reverse, of course, is true if the average price of good two is 
above the competitive level.  This reasoning suggests that if, in some period, the price of 
good one is above the competitive level we should see production of good one rise and 
vice versa.  This turns out to be the case in over 83% of periods in ten runs for which it 
was examined.  Furthermore, almost all of the periods during which production does not 
move in the direction suggested by mean price are clustered around the peaks and valleys 
of the resource allocation cycle when the price is generally closest to competitive levels. 
  The other dynamic force moves the price of good one above competitive levels 
when it is under-produced and below when it is overproduced.  A more restrictive 
  19 sufficient phenomena would be if the price tends to move towards the market clearing 
price (i.e. the competitive price given the existing resource allocation which itself is not 
always at the competitive level).  This seems to be roughly the case.  Figure 2a shows the 
market clearing price and the observed mean price of good one for a typical run (with 
only every fifth observation shown for legibility).  Figure 2b shows the market clearing 
price and the observed mean price (every tenth observation graphed) when the model is 
altered so that agents do not change the good they produce: the same 600 agents are all 
producing good one.  The preference parameter   moves back and forth between .6 and 
.3 and the resultant market clearing prices are 1 and 2/7 respectively.  While it is clear 
that agents trade at prices near to the market clearing level, it is not obvious why they do 
so given that their behaviour is a simple imitative algorithm and they lack information 
about the current resource allocation needed to determine what that price would be.  
ρ
Consider that a particular pricing strategy propagates through agents more readily 
if it delivers for its users more utility.  If we imagine a much more clever agent faced 
with the same problem these agents face for selecting a price, that more clever agent has 
both benefits and costs to a marginal increase in the price it posts.  The obvious benefit is 
that the agent gets a better deal from the customers (visiting agents) it does deal with.
16   
The cost of raising the price offered is that it increases the likelihood that the 
agent will find itself too low on its visitors' ordered lists, too few agents visit to trade, and  
                                                 
16 An additional potential benefit is that by posting a high price, visiting agents are less likely to 
have the agent near the top of their sorted lists, in which case the agent has more opportunity to trade at the 
best price it finds among the agents it visited without a danger that it runs out of its stock of marketed 
product by selling it to visitors.  As it turns out, this is not a consideration at actualized strategies since 
agents generally propose prices more favourable to themselves than the ones they encounter. 
  20 Figure 2a
Circles: Observed Price        Triangles: Market Clearing Price
  Price
Market Clearing and Observed Prices
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  21 the agent finds itself at the end of the period having engaged in an insufficient number of 
trades.  Note that without the price comparison process, the cost of raising the price 
disappears and so the imitative algorithm selects higher prices.  The implication of this is 
that the costs and benefits of raising the price must balance at or near the market clearing 
price.   
To test this four different cases were run in which all but ten agents had the same 
fixed pricing strategy, while the remaining ten agents, all of whom produced good one, 
had their pricing strategy fixed at some other level.  Furthermore, the production 
strategies of all agents was fixed to maintain a stable market clearing price.  The first case 
had N-10 agents employing strategies giving a market clearing price (They offered .1 of 
their production good in exchange for .1 of the other good.) while the other ten agents 
offered exchanges at a higher price (offering .099 of their production good for .1 of the 
other good).  The second case also had N-10 agents offer a market clearing price with the 
other ten agents offering a lower price (.101 if their good for .1 of the other good).  The 
third case had 10 agents offering a market clearing price while the other N-10 agents 
offered a higher price.  The fourth case had 10 agents offering a market clearing price 
while the others offered a lower price.   
Table 2 summarizes the results; the figure reported is the percentage of periods in 
which the group of agents employing the competitive pricing strategy have a higher mean 
utility than the other group of agents.  The higher these figures, the more it suggests the 
costs and benefits of price movement balance at the competitive price and so the more 
stable it is as a phenomena resulting from agent behaviour.  For example suppose initially 
all agents offer exchanges at the competitive price and a small number of them, due to 
  22 strategy mutation, begin to offer a higher price.  This describes the first case.  The agents 
maintaining the competitive pricing strategy are on average usually doing better.  Thus 
we expect both that these agents will not adopt the higher price and that the ones that did 
will abandon their new high price by imitating the majority of agents offering  
Table 2 
Majority Pricing Strategy  Minority Pricing Strategy  Stability Percentage 
Competitive 1 Higher  than 
Competitive 
101/100 75.6 





101/99 Competitive  1  98.8 
Lower than 
Competitive 
99/100 Competitive  1  85.5 
 
competitive prices--which suggests stability around the competitive price.   For three of 
the four cases we have results suggesting movement towards the competitive price.  This 
is consistent with general stability at the competitive price since in the case where a 
minority of agents offering a lower than competitive price do better, the resulting 
dynamics would lead to something more resembling the case where the majority offer a 
low price and do less well than the minority still offering a competitive price.   
  To see why it is that these costs and benefits balance near the market clearing 
price we need to consider the role of  —the decision of how much of its product an 
agent keeps for personal consumption and how much it makes available for trade.  If all 
of the agents are initially employing strategies leading to a competitive outcome and then 
those producing good two were to switch to a higher  , the agents producing good one 
will respond by offering a lower price on good one—they now face a positive probability 
ki
k2
  23 of being unable to make enough trades and so those that avoid that by offering a slightly 
lower price can on average outperform those that do not.  Another way of viewing the 
effect of   is to note that by increasing  , the marginal cost of a price increase for 
producers of good one is increased because the probability of engaging in too few trades 
has increased, so it is by way of    that producers of good two prevent producers of 





Table 3: Prices with   and   held constant.  k2 wp
Implicit Price of Strategy 
 



























































of the base model designed to test this—  for all agents is fixed at 3 levels: one run 
each with   below, at, and above the competitive level.  (.3, .4, and .5 respectively)  The 
production strategy   was also held fixed at the competitive level, otherwise it soaks up 
the effect of   on price by shifting resource allocation until the price returns to the 
competitive level.  The mean observed price of transactions and the mean price of the 
strategies employed by producers of good one are shown as well as the bounds of their 
95% confidence intervals.  As expected, the higher  , the lower the price of good one 






  24 In the base model agents do not collude to restrict supply; they choose their 
strategies imitatively.  So despite the advantage of affecting price by jointly restricting 
supply, agents choose individually beneficial levels of   producing an approximately 
competitive price. 
k
Given some distribution of   strategies, if every agent posts the market clearing 
price, the marginal cost of raising one's price is almost zero: the probability of being 
unable to make enough trades due to a higher price is close to zero since the market is 
nearly clearing.  Thus if all agents learn to set a price where the marginal costs and 
benefits of a price change are equal, barring a large discontinuity in the costs when the 
probability of unrealized trades becomes positive, agents will set a price that is more 
favourable to themselves than the market clearing price.  The results of the base model 
support this reasoning.  Figure 3 shows the mean price of good one posted by producers 
of good one, the mean price of good one posted by producers of good two, and the 
market clearing price.  The mean price posted by producers of good one is usually greater 
than the market clearing price (true in 80.1% of periods in the ten runs) which in turn is 
usually greater than the mean price of good one posted by producers of good two (true in 
85.2% of periods in the ten runs). 
ki
The overall dynamics of the base model are similar to the story of Adam Smith's 
invisible hand.  Agents post prices near to market clearing to avoid a large probability of 
being caught absorbing excess supply (which works because agents engage in price 
comparison).  On average the observed price is close to the market clearing level because 
agents with different production strategies are posting prices on opposite sides of market 
  25 clearing and because price comparison will likely mean agents with prices closer to 
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advantageous production strategy, which reduces that advantage.  Lags between actual 
and perceived advantages (due to non-instantaneous price adjustment in the information-
poor environment) cause agents to keep shifting into an industry even after it has become 
disadvantageous to do so, leading to a cyclical outcome around the competitive one.  
4 VARIANTS OF THE BASE MODEL 
  This section discusses the robustness of the base.  For an agent-based general 
equilibrium model to produce an outcome approximately that of a competitive 
equilibrium while also portraying economic agents as pursuers of self-interest, it needs 
three features: 
  26 1) The set of possible actions the n agents are able to undertake (arising from the set of 
possible strategies fed through the economic environment) must include nearly optimal 
behaviour at the individual level and something near a competitive outcome at the 
economy level.  i.e. It must be possible for agents to choose optimal actions and it must 
be possible for agents to choose a competitive outcome. 
2) If each agent chooses its optimal strategy at time t  given its information set, the 
outcome needs to be approximately a competitive outcome. 
3) The learning algorithm agents use finds something close to the optimal strategy.  
A number of variants of the base model are considered and analysed in terms of 
their impact on the above three features.  When describing the variations, only the 
differences from the base model are outlined.  Table 4 at the end of this section presents 
summary statistics on these variations.  As in the base model, ten runs of one thousand 
periods were generated for each variant. 
4.1 Altering the strategy-action relationship 
  The inability of the base model without price comparison to result in the 
competitive outcome can be attributed to agents not trading at the most favourable 
available price first, but the strategies could deliver such action only by coincidence.  
Here I present two variants on the base model designed to build a favourable-price-first 
action into the strategies subject to learning. 
  Variant 1.1—The formation of   from {}  is governed by strategies 
subject to the learning algorithm.  Each agent a has an additional exchange strategy   
consisting of the integers one through ten in some order.  If the first integer in   is  , 












γ ) is the one met producing the 
  27 appropriate good (i.e. from γ )  with the  th lowest price.  If the second integer is r , the 
second agent visited is the one with the  th lowest price, and so on.  This strategy is 
imitated from the most successful agent encountered.  It is mutated with independent 
probability   for every agent.  If this strategy is mutated for an agent, then two entries 




                                                 
  Agents in variant 1.1 were able to learn to find a competitive outcome but not as 
effectively as in the base model.  Figure 5a shows resource allocation and figure 5b the 
mean price.
17  Agents obtained a lower mean utility, 79.8 over ten runs, as opposed to 
94.2 in the base model, although this is an improvement over the base model without 
price comparison which had mean utility of 45.2.  Figure 5c shows the path of the mean 
of the first three entries in this ordering strategy for a typical run.
18  Optimally they would 
have values of one, two, and three respectively.  The first entry tended to be low—it had 
a mean value of 3.48 over the ten runs and exhibited a pattern of staying just above one 
with periodic spells at higher values.  On average 48.1% of the agents had it equal to one 
in any period over the ten runs.  The other nine entries had mean values greater than five 
and did not appear to differ much from each other overall.  What price comparison that 
did occur consisted of most agents visiting the best price first and the remaining visits 
being carried out in random order.  This was, however, significantly more successful than 
no price comparison  
17 Some of the values for the mean price are as high as 24, so to preserve the graph's legibility, values 
greater than 2 are shown as 2.  No values greater than 2 were observed after the 60th period in any of the 
ten runs. 
18 With only every 5th period shown. 






































Resource Allocation Variant 1.1
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Mean Price Variant 1.1
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Variant 1.2—Agents do not engage in price comparison but do have additional 
strategies   and  : reserve prices.  The conditions for a proposed trade to be carried 
out become: i) Each agent will remain holding at least as much as its relevant   strategy 
dictates and ii) The implicit price of the trade does not exceed the visiting agent's relevant 
reserve price.   
rp1 rp2
k
This new strategy and trade condition could apparently function in a way similar 
to price comparison—it potentially punishes agents who post high prices—but it could 
not however deliver on this.  Over the ten runs the mean level of utility was 47.8, only 
slightly better than the base model without price comparison.  There was no typical 
resource allocation result; the chief similarity between runs was that most cycled around 
some level that was not the competitive allocation, but that level varied from run to run.  
Figure 6 shows resource allocation for three of the runs.  
  30 The above two variants were designed to endogenize price comparison as a 
learned behaviour and met with mixed success.  The price-ordering strategy is rather 
contrived.  It conditions learning on information of which the proper use should be 
obvious.  One possible extension would be to have agents learn to revisit agents with 
favourable prices based on previous encounters, a set-up that has been employed by 
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4.2 Alterations in Agents' Optimal Strategy 
  One variation was considered that significantly altered the agents' optimal 
strategy. 
  Variant 2.1—Agents' exchange proposal strategies  ,  ,  , and r , are 







  31 produce.  Visiting agents respond by purchasing up to the optimal quantity, limited by the 
visited agent's relevant   strategy.    k
  Note that if two agents producing different goods are involved together in their 
first interactions of a trading stage, the visiting agent will spend the same amount of its 
production good regardless of the price.
19  Thus, in such an encounter, the visited agent's 
subsequent utility rises with its posted price.  Price comparison was not able to prevent 
offered prices from climbing geometrically—presumably as fast as mutation and 
propagation via imitation allowed.  Figure 7 shows the natural log of the mean level of 
strategies   and  .  Figure 8a shows the resource allocation and figure 8b shows the 
mean price.  
p1 p2



























Mean Posted Price Variant 2.1
Period
 Producers of Good One  Producers of Good Two







                                                 
19 If the visiting agent produces good 1, it spends (1-ρ)e1.  If it produces good 2, it spends ρe2. 
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Price of Good One Variant 2.1
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  34 dependent upon whether it is visited (and receives goods nearly for free) before visiting 
or vice versa (in which case it gives goods nearly for free).  Hence the observed price will 
reflect the resource allocation by being above one if more agents produce good one and 
hence are more likely to be visited first, otherwise below.  This suggests that if   were 
0.5, the mean price would be 1 and resource allocation would also be near the 
competitive level.  This was borne out in the results.  With   set equal to 0.5 throughout 
the 1000 periods of a run, the mean price was 0.995 over 10 runs and resource allocation 
stayed near 500 (with a mean value of 501) agents producing each of the goods.  Figures 
9a and 9b show the results of typical run.  Despite nearly competitive price and resource 
allocation, mean utility was only 71.5 over ten runs and every individual trade had a price 
growing arbitrarily far from the competitive level.  This suggests that summary statistics 
in agent-based models have the potential to be misleading.   
ρ
ρ
One other variant was considered that had the potential to alter the agents' optimal 
strategy.   
Variant 2.2—An additional criterion was added to the base model for a proposed 
trade to be realized.  If utility went down for either agent, the trade was rejected.   
Qualitatively the outcome was the same as the base model and so the results are 
not presented.  Mean utility was slightly lower at 92.6 vs. 94.2 in the base model. 
4.3 Variations in the Learning Algorithm  
  Three minor variations in the learning algorithm were analyzed.  
Variant 3.1—Agents imitate all exchange strategies from the most successful 
agent met. 
  35 Variant 3.2—Agents do not imitate their inactive exchange strategies.  The active 
exchange strategies are imitated from the most successful agent met who produced the 
same good. 
Variant 3.3—Agents imitate probabilistically with more successful agents 
encountered more likely to be imitated than less successful agents.  Agents encountered 
who produced good one are ranked from most successful to least successful.  If agent   
is ranked   and agent b is ranked  , then agent   is twice as likely to be imitated 
(for its active exchange strategies) as agent b.  Probabilities are scaled so that some agent 
is imitated.  Similarly, agents who produced good two are ranked and one is chosen from 
whom its active exchange strategies are imitated.  All agents met are ranked and with 
probability   an agent is chosen for imitation of the production strategy. 
a
q q + 1 a
JCR
  None of the above three variants produced results qualitatively different from the 
base model, so the results are not presented.  
  The final variants on the learning algorithm employed genetic algorithms (GAs) 
for learning.
20  Each agent has its strategy represented as a binary string   bits long 
written over the alphabet  .  Each of the six exchange strategies is represented by an 
 bit section of the string.  If   is the substring for one of those strategies and 
 is the  th entry in that substring, then the value for that strategy is given by 
 where i  for, o ,  , and  , while   for  ,  , and  .  The  th 






















= 1 k1 i = 2 o2 r2 k 61 Λ +
wp
 
20 Formalized by Holland (1977), the GA is as yet the most common learning algorithm in the ACE 
literature. 
  36   The strategy strings were subject to the standard crossover and mutation 




 pairs with each of 
the   agents in one pair.  With an independent probability of 0.6, a pair of agents will 
swap some elements of their strategy string.  If so, a number   is randomly 
chosen and the agents swap the first   elements of their strategy string.  Regarding 
mutation, each element of each agent's strategy string, with an independent probability of 
0.033 toggles its value—to zero if one and to one if zero.   
n
{ c ∈ 6 . . . ,Λ}
                                                
c
  The third genetic operator used, reproduction, was employed in two forms: 
tournament reproduction and proportional selection.  Tournament reproduction was 
applied by randomly selecting two agents and adding the one which obtained the higher 
level of utility to the pool of strategy strings to exist in the next period.  The process was 
implemented   times to determine the strategies of the   agents in the next period.  Each 
of the   agents was equally available to be selected for each of the n tournaments.  
Proportional selection was applied by making   independent random selections of the 
agents' strategies to populate the subsequent period, where an agent's probability of being 





Variant 3.4—The strategy imitation and mutation regimes are replaced by a GA 
consisting of tournament reproduction, crossover, and genetic mutation, implemented in 
that order.
21 
Variant 3.5—The strategy imitation and mutation regimes are replaced by a GA 
consisting of proportional selection, crossover, and genetic mutation, implemented in that 
order.   
 
21 Both variants with GAs had strategy strings initialized where each bit of each strategy string had an 
independent even chance of starting as a zero or one. 
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  38    The GAs performance was mixed.  It appears to find something near the 
competitive outcome, but relative to the other learning algorithms that did so, the GAs 
obtained the lowest mean utility: 81.5 with tournament reproduction and 80.2 with 
proportional selection.  The resource allocations were biased towards a fifty-fifty split, 
with tournament reproduction less biased.  Figure 10a shows resource allocation with the 
GAs and figure 10b shows mean price.
22   
4.4 Spatially Placed Agents 
  One last pair of variants considered affects all of the above mentioned features.  
Agents were placed on a lattice—as if occupying the squares of a checker board fifty 
spaces across and twenty high.   
Variant 4.1—Agents interacted only with ten of their nearest neighbours—the 
eight adjacent agents, the agent two spots directly east, and the agent two spots directly 
west.
23 
Variant 4.2—Agents visited ten other agents chosen randomly each period from 
the twenty-four nearest neighbours. 
A priori it would seem that this alteration should have two effects.  One is that by 
observing and imitating neighbours, an agent is choosing from strategies that interacted 
(last period) with agents that the agent in question is more likely to encounter (rather than 
some random subset of the entire population as in the base model).  This may have the 
effect of making the search algorithm more effective, at least from the individual agents' 
point of view.  Working against that, the spatial arrangement limits the flow of new, 
                                                 
22 Only every fifth period is shown. 
23 In both variants 4.1 and 4.2, for the purpose of providing agents on the edges of the lattice with a full 
complement of neighbours, the lattice is reflected on an infinite plain.  Equivalently, the lattice is a 
projection of the surface of a torus. 
  39 superior strategies (obtained by mutation) relative to the mix-and-match encounters of the 
base model.   The agents in variant 4.1 obtained less utility than in variant 4.2, 86.9 vs. 
93.1, presumably because the propagation of strategies was more restricted.  The resource 
allocation was, however, similar in both variants to the base model, and so is not shown. 
 
Table 4
24  Summary Statistics of the Base Model and Variants 








Base Model    94.2 599  312  0.989 
1.1  Price ordering 
is a strategy 
84.6 623  314  1.314 
1.2  Reserve price  47.8 640  258  0.980 
2.1  Respond 
'optimally' to 
price 
61.3 499  454  0.958 
2.2  Utility falling 
cancels trade 
92.6 582  378  0.985 
3.1  Imitate only 
from best 
83.2 634  376  1.023 
3.2  Imitate only 
active strategies 
92.2 588  330  1.000 
3.3  Imitate 
probabilistically 
96.2 600  324  0.992 
3.4  GA 
Tournament 
reproduction 
81.5 549  388  1.004 
3.5  GA 
Proportional 
Selection 
80.2 534  422  1.004 
4.1  Lattice, visiting 
same always 
86.9 617  269  0.963 
4.2  Lattice, visiting 
10 of 24 
93.1 595  298  0.973 
 
                                                 
24 All values given are means over ten runs of one thousand periods. 
25 Resource Allocation 600 is the mean number of agents producing good one when rho = .6 and so the 
optimal number of such agents is 600. Resource Allocation 300 is obtained similarly for rho = .3. 
  40  
5. CONCLUSION 
  I analysed a model in which, due to the local nature of information and 
interaction, the agents' problem is extremely complex.  With global information it is 
straightforward to ascertain the (optimal) competitive equilibrium. 
  Each agent chooses what to produce, what price to post and package size to use 
for its product, and a response to prices encountered.  These decisions are guided by an 
imitative learning algorithm.  Agents' behaviour at the global level appears to be guided 
by Smith's invisible hand, but this is entirely generated by and emerges from local 
interactions.  Agents shift resources towards producing the good that is trading at a price 
above its long run competitive level.  The price tends toward the market clearing level 
(although with a lag due to the local nature of information) because suppliers respond to 
excess supply by lowering prices.   
  Due to the lag in price adjustment, the economy cycles around the competitive 
equilibrium.  If good one is initially overproduced, its market clearing price is greater 
than the long run competitive level.  Prices move towards that market clearing level, 
eventually becoming greater than the long run competitive level.  Agents start shifting 
resources into producing good one, but when it is eventually produced at the long run 
competitive level, prices have yet to reflect this.  Agents thus continue shifting resources 
towards producing good one and it becomes overproduced.  Consequently its price 
eventually falls below the long run competitive level and agents shift resources away 
from producing it.  Because of the price lag, agents again overshoot the competitive level 
and return to under-producing good one. 
  41   A key aspect of the model is that agents engage in some price comparison prior to 
trading, and attempt to trade first with the most favourable price found.  Without this 
price comparison, agents have no incentive to reduce prices in the face of excess supply--
the costs of such a market disequilibrium are distributed randomly rather than to those 
whose actions (setting high prices) are creating (or maintaining) the disequilibrium.  
Agents can learn to practice price comparison, but not with great precision. 
  Additionally, a case was found where summary statistics of an agent-based model 
can be highly misleading—resource allocation and mean price were at competitive levels 
but every actual trade was being carried out at prices growing arbitrarily large. 
  The genetic algorithm (GA) proved unable to effectively search over strategies 
relative to the more directed learning algorithm employed which presumably must make 
better use of the information available to agents.  This result cannot be treated as 
definitively condemning use of the GA in agent-based GE models.  Dawid and Kopel 
(1998) showed that the outcome of a GA can be sensitive to the method by which a 
strategy is encoded as a binary string.  Their result seemed to be driven by a significant 
amount of behavioural information being encoded in one particular bit of the strategy 
string—a feature shared here by the bit encoding the production decision. 
  Thus an agent-based general equilibrium model with an emergent invisible hand 
has been formulated.  Agents in the model need to be able to engage in price comparison 
and may need to employ a more focussed learning algorithm than the GA. 
  42 APPENDIX A: The base model as code for Gauss. 
 
 










canMake = { 1 1 }; 
visits=10; 
 





  for t(1,endOfTime,1); year=t; 
  if  year==500; 
   rho=.3; 
  endif; 
  x=Produce; 
  {x,peopleMet,q1by1,q2by1,q1by2,q2by2}=Trade;     
  {offer,request,keep}=Imitate(peopleMet); 
  WM=SwitchJobs(peopleMet); 
  {offer,request,keep}=Mutate; 
















  43 proc (4) = Genesis; 















proc (1) = GetInLine; 
  /* This procedure returns an N element vector of integers 1 through N  
     inclusive in random order */ 
 local  order,coin,i; 
 order=zeros(N,1); 
 coin=rndu(N,1); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  order[i]=maxindc(coin); 






















  44 proc (1) = KnockOnDoors; 
  /* Returns an N by visits matrix whose elements are integers drawn from 1 
     through N inclusive.  The ith row will contain visits different randomly 
     (independently) determined integers none of which equals i.  That row 
     indicates who will be visited by agent i.  */ 
 local  clients,i,coin,j,a; 
 clients=zeros(N,visits); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  coin=rndu(N,1); 
    coin[i]=0;/*Prevents agents from trying to visit themselves*/ 
  for  j(1,visits,1); 
   a=maxindc(coin); 
   clients[i,j]=a; 
   coin[a]=0;/*Prevents  double  visiting*/ 





proc (1) = Produce; 
 local  i,lx; 
 lx=zeros(N,2); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 





























oc=ComparePrices(clients); /*oc stands for ordered clients*/ 







do until traded==1 or done==1; 
if not j>cols(oc); 
if not oc[i,j]==0; 
if lx[i,WM[i]]-request[oc[i,j],WM[i]] >= keep[i,WM[i]]; 
















    e n d i f ;  
endif; 















proc(1) = DropComrades(clients); 
/*  Comrades are those visited agents producing the same good as the visiting 
agent and between whom no trades occur.  All comrades in the list of  
agents to visit have their entry set to zero and the remaining agents  
are shifted to the left so the zeros are at the end of the row.  This  
procedure is only called in the version without price comparison and  
replaces the procedure ComparePrices.  */ 
 local  stores,i,j,storesFound; 
 stores=zeros(N,visits); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  storesFound=0; 
  for  j(1,visits,1); 
   if  not  (WM[i]==WM[clients[i,j]]); 
    storesFound=storesFound+1; 
    stores[i,storesFound]=clients[i,j]; 
   endif; 



































if not clients[i,j]==0; 
if not WM[i]==WM[clients[i,j]]; 
foundSomeone=1; 

































  48 proc(1)=SwitchJobs(f); 
  /* The procedure's argument f is the N by visits matrix of who visited whom.  
     It will be used to construct the matrix 'folks' which will be, on row i, 
     a list of all agents encountered by agent i both as visitor and visitee.  */ 




 for  i(1,N,1);  /*This loop puts visitors and visited in the same matrix*/ 
  for  j(1,visits,1); 
   k=1; 
      if not f[i,j]==0;   
    do  until  folks[f[i,j],k]==0; 
     k=k+1; 
    if  k>cols(folks); 
     folks=folks~zeros(N,1); 
    e n d i f ;  
    endo; 
    folks[f[i,j],k]=i; 
   endif; 
  endfor; 
 endfor; 
 u=(x[.,1]^rho).*(x[.,2]^(1-rho)); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  if  coin[i]<jobChangeRate; 
   b e s t = i ;  
   for  j(1,cols(folks),1); 
    if  folks[i,j]>0; 
     if  u[folks[i,j]]>u[best]; 
      best=folks[i,j]; 
     e n d i f ;  
    e n d i f ;  
   endfor; 
   lWM[i]=WM[best]; 












  49 proc (3) = Imitate(f); 




 for  i(1,N,1);  /*This loop puts visitors and visited in the same matrix*/ 
  for  j(1,visits,1); 
   k=1; 
   do  until  folks[f[i,j],k]==0; 
    k=k+1; 
    if  k>cols(folks); 
     folks=folks~zeros(N,1); 
    e n d i f ;  
   endo; 
   folks[f[i,j],k]=i; 
  endfor; 
 endfor; 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  best=i;best1=i;best2=i; 
  for  j(1,cols(folks),1); 
            if folks[i,j]>0; 
  if  u[folks[i,j]]>u[best];best=folks[i,j];endif; 
    if u[folks[i,j]]>u[best1] and WM[folks[i,j]]==1; 
best1=folks[i,j]; 
endif; 
    if u[folks[i,j]]>u[best2] and WM[folks[i,j]]==2; 
best2=folks[i,j]; 
endif; 
            endif; 
 endfor; 
  lo[i,1]=offer[best1,1]; 
  lo[i,2]=offer[best2,2]; 
  lr[i,1]=request[best2,1]; 
  lr[i,2]=request[best1,2]; 
  lk[i,1]=keep[best1,1]; 











  50 proc (3) = Mutate; 
 local  lo,lr,lk,coin; 
 lo=offer;lr=request;lk=keep; 
 coin=rndu(N,6); 
 for  i(1,N,1); 
  if  coin[i,1]<=mutationRate;lo[i,1]=(bot+(top-bot)*rndu(1,1))*lo[i,1];endif; 
  if  coin[i,2]<=mutationRate;lo[i,2]=(bot+(top-bot)*rndu(1,1))*lo[i,2];endif; 
  if  coin[i,3]<=mutationRate;lr[i,1]=(bot+(top-bot)*rndu(1,1))*lr[i,1];endif; 
  if  coin[i,4]<=mutationRate;lr[i,2]=(bot+(top-bot)*rndu(1,1))*lr[i,2];endif; 
  if  coin[i,5]<=mutationRate;lk[i,1]=(bot+(top-bot)*rndu(1,1))*lk[i,1];endif; 





  51 proc (0) = Report; 













  output file = figure1.out on; 
  format /rd 7,0; year;;prod1;; 
  format /rd 8,3; 
avgp1;;avgu;;keep1;;keep2;;p1by1;;p1by2;;avgr2overo1;;avgo2overr1; 
    output file = figure1.out off; 
  /* The output each period here is: 
 The  period. 
  The number of agents producing good one. 
  The average price of trades. (All prices reported in terms of good one; P2 
normalized to 1.) 
  The mean utility (across agents). 
  The mean value of the strategy k1. 
  The mean value of the strategy k2. 
  The average price of trades conducted with agents producing good 1 as 
stores.   
  The average price of trades conducted with agents producing good 2 as 
stores. 
  The average implicit price offered by producers of good 1. 
  The average implicit price offered by producers of good 2. */ 
endp; 
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